

# DUAL NATIONALITY IN FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA: RECENT DEBATES ON SOCIAL COHESION AND CIVIC VALUES

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In France, recently, political debate on dual nationality<sup>1</sup> has come to the fore. Past and present members of the French government have expressed concerns that dual nationality not only leads to divided loyalties and weakened social cohesion but that it also threatens the survival of France's national identity. Similar concerns are echoed in many other liberal-democratic nations including Australia where incumbent governments have expressed the need for recently naturalised citizens to understand and embrace the core civic values that are purported to safeguard the country's national identity. Yet, unlike in the French context where there have been attempts to abolish the right to dual nationality, in Australia traditional opposition to dual nationality has moderated so that now Australian citizens can safely take up the citizenship of another nation without risking loss of their Australian citizenship status. Despite these differences in support for citizens' rights to dual nationality, the recent debates on citizenship laws in France and Australia share many common themes. These concerns need to be understood as part of worldwide debates about what it means to be a loyal and model citizen of a nation during a period characterised by intense globalisation and trans-nationalism.

This article presents an historical analysis of the debates and events that have put into the spotlight the notion of dual nationality in contemporary France and provides a brief comparative analysis with recent reforms to citizenship laws in Australia. It explores the events that have fuelled this debate: they include former President Sarkozy's push for a right-wing agenda on immigration and national identity policies, the Front National's anti-dual nationality position and France's dual-nationality football quota scandal of 2011. The analysis reveals how changes to naturalisation laws have become

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<sup>1</sup> Dual nationality was introduced in France in 1973 and in Australia in 2002.

enmeshed with policies that are purported to secure national identities through the implementation of core civic values. In France these values have been championed as uniquely republican values that promote migrant assimilation into the French population while in Australia the focus has been on liberal-democratic values framed through the policy of multiculturalism. Despite the championing of different value systems (republican versus liberal-democratic), the overarching effect of these citizenship reforms highlights how both France and Australia use these discourses in order to reassure the 'mainstream' populations that their way of life will prevail in a constantly globalising world.

### **Introducing the Goasguen Report and parallel Australian preoccupations**

In June 2011, the French newspaper *Libération* leaked a government report drafted by the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) minister, Claude Goasguen (Goasguen 2011). This 'working document' focussed on reforming citizenship and civic education laws in France. It outlined twenty-two recommendations for the promotion of republican values in education, especially in the teaching of French history, making citizens declare their allegiance to the nation and making naturalised citizens choose one nationality, enhancing the status of French permanent residents, amending rules relating to the nationality code in order to introduce a naturalisation test and reinforcing the role of the public service.

Public controversy immediately erupted around the leaked report, particularly criticism of the recommendations that related to the abolition of dual nationality for naturalised French citizens. Claude Goasguen, a staunch supporter of Nicolas Sarkozy, was the principal author. Goasguen promptly responded to the outcry by claiming that the report was a draft and not intended for distribution or public scrutiny (Bamat 2011). The report was immediately shelved, but a few months later the government released another report on immigration and citizenship reform that safeguarded the status of dual nationality while stimulating a debate about the need for immigrants to adopt French civic values.

The concerns outlined in the Goasguen Report share many similarities with debates about citizenship that have dominated Australian political discourse over the past decade. In 2005, the Howard government introduced

the *National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* in order to teach a set of values that were claimed to have been forged in Australian history. The following year the Australian government convened the History Summit in order to reform the high school curriculum on Australian history and emphasise the nation's historical achievements, a desire that would also come to preoccupy President Sarkozy in relation to French history. In 2007, the government introduced the *Australian Values Statement* which all long-term visitors must sign and promise to uphold before they can enter the country. At the same time, the Coalition Howard government introduced the Australian citizenship test, a test that required that all aspiring citizens learn about Australian values, Australian history and the civic responsibilities and rights of Australian citizenship (Chisari 2012).

These changes in civic education and reforms of naturalisation laws have played an important part in both French and Australian politics in recent years. They should be understood as a manifestation of a global phenomenon that has brought into question the continued significance of nation-states in a highly globalised world. The focus on dual nationality is part of a wider debate about a global 'crisis in citizenship'. In France in particular it is a response to a broader national concern that has been raging since the 1980s. This public debate focuses around safeguarding France's national identity from what are perceived to be growing 'threats' imposed by globalisation. Goasguen confirms this burgeoning anxiety over the forces of globalisation by writing in the report that France's national identity was being 'drained of its substance because of globalisation' (Bamat 2011).

Over the last century, globalising waves of change have had a demographic and economic impact on former colonial powers and Western nations. Both France and Australia have been faced with global economic shifts, including the relative decline of manufacturing and other traditional industries, and with the social and cultural challenges of new immigrant populations. However important the immigrants' economic roles are considered to be to the well-being of the population, both countries have agonised over immigration, refugee and citizenship policies. As a result, these cultural and social changes, triggered by mass migration, have been translated into popular anxieties and have found expression in the views of marginal right-wing parties such that they have changed the ideological landscape and policies of major parties. It is in these contexts that the question of dual citizenship has been approached

by governments, by policy makers and by mainstream and marginal political parties. Before we can analyse the changes that were proposed for dual nationality laws, it is important to provide a brief definition of citizenship in France and Australia.

## French Citizenship

Citizenship in France is premised on the notion of *jus soli* (birthplace citizenship) and dual nationality has been permitted since 1973, based on the assumption that it ensured ‘the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’ ([www.dual-citizenship.com](http://www.dual-citizenship.com)).<sup>2</sup> The notion of equality before the law is prescribed under the 1804 Napoleonic Civic Code of France which established modern French nationality laws (Weil 2008, 4). Weil explains, ‘from this point on nationality became a right attached to the person [...], it was no longer lost if its holder established residency abroad’ (2008, 4). Its roots lie in the French Revolution and the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*.

According to Laborde (2011, 136), French citizenship laws are based on the double affirmation of individual autonomy and political equality. This relationship between the citizen and the French state is ‘constructed in terms of emancipation and allegiance’, whereby in becoming a citizen, individuals abandon their ‘minority’ status in order to achieve ‘majority’ status (Laborde 2011, 136–137). This citizen has both universalistic and egalitarian status because s/he is endowed with fundamental rights that make no distinction between the citizen’s origin, race or religion (Laborde 2011, 137).

In this way, French nationality laws are underpinned by France’s commitment to implementing the policy of assimilation as a way of managing differences within its citizenry. Indeed, ethnic and cultural differences among the population are not acknowledged by French governments and no information relating to the ethnic backgrounds of citizens is collected by government. Assimilation is favoured as a way of respecting equality among all people and promoting universalism. All candidates for permanent residency other than asylum seekers must sign an ‘Entry and Integration Contract’

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<sup>2</sup> For an up-to-date account of the complex history of French citizenship and dual nationality see Bertossi & Hajjat, 2013.

(*Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration*), committing themselves to the acquisition of the French language and familiarisation with the French way of life.

Weil (2008, 238) argues that generally in the past the French have been 'indifferent' to those people holding dual nationality and he believes that this has contributed to 'the smooth integration of a large number of immigrants, for, when nationality of origin has no practical impact, it is gradually lost in succeeding generations' (Weil 2008, 238). He further added in 2011 that allowing French nationals to hold on to their dual nationalities has positive implications for the policy of integration (Weil 2011). Firstly he cites the recent inclusion of members of the national assembly elected by French nationals living outside France. These French citizens living abroad, many of them holding dual nationality, are an asset to France and they spread the influence of French culture to the rest of the world. He writes about French historical values and the contemporary threats to them:

After the First World War France was governed by republicans who believed in her, in her historical values, in the four pillars of nationality—equality, the French language, a positive memory of the Revolution and secularism. [...] Today these values which unite the French are being manipulated by rulers who seek to create divisions: between believers and non-believers, Muslims and non-Muslims and now between citizens with a single and dual nationality. Thanks to these values France retains an enormous potential of integration and influence in the world, and for this purpose bi-nationals are a great asset: we must therefore abandon this regressive and morbid debate which stunts us, forsake these artificial divisions and turn towards a future we must build together.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Après la Première Guerre Mondiale, la France était dirigée par des républicains qui avaient confiance en elle, en ses valeurs historiques, les quatre piliers de la nationalité—l'égalité, la langue française, la mémoire positive de la Révolution et la laïcité [...]. Aujourd'hui ces valeurs qui unissent les Français sont manipulées par un pouvoir qui cherche à les diviser : entre croyants et non croyants ; entre musulmans et non musulmans et maintenant entre mono- et binationaux. Autour de ses valeurs la France garde un énorme potentiel d'intégration et de rayonnement dans le monde, et pour cela les binationaux sont un atout : il nous faut donc sortir d'un débat régressif

## Australian Citizenship

In the Australian context, citizenship was originally based on birthplace, *jus soli*, and the right to dual nationality has always been contentious. No provision for dual nationality existed in the *Australian Citizenship Act, 1948*, and in its original form it actually discriminated against Australian-born citizens who acquired the citizenship of another nation, whether automatically or by naturalisation. The act stipulated that

a person, being an Australian citizen who has attained the age of eighteen years, who does any act or thing: (a) the sole or dominant purpose of which; and (b) the effect of which; is to acquire the nationality or citizenship of a foreign country, shall, upon that acquisition, cease to be an Australian citizen (Millbank 2000).

This clause had a real impact on Australian citizens working abroad, in particular in French government positions such as in universities because they needed to become naturalised French citizens in order to ensure continuing employment as French public servants. In 1976, a Parliamentary Inquiry's recommendation to repeal section 17 of the nationality laws was rejected. It was not until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and as the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Federation approached that the question of granting the right of dual nationality was put on the agenda.

In 1999, the Australian Citizenship Council was convened in order to explore the significance of Australian citizenship one hundred years after Federation. It is in its report, *Australian Citizenship for a New Century*, that the Australian Citizenship Council recommended the adoption of the Australian Compact, that is, a set of core civic values that all Australians were expected to abide by. This compact became the forerunner to the *Australian Values Statement* that is in place today. The Australian Citizenship Council also recommended repealing section 17 of the *Australian Citizenship Act, 1948*, and this was accepted (Australian Citizenship Council, 2000). Hence since 2002 Australian citizens, whether born with Australian citizenship or naturalised, are legally permitted to hold dual nationality.

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et malsain qui nous rabougrit, sortir de ces divisions artificielles et se tourner vers un avenir à construire ensemble (Weil 2011).

## The recommendations of the Goasguen Report

In his preamble, Goasguen claimed that his proposed changes would strengthen the citizenry's commitment to France's republican values and the French language. The Report states:

In order for a sense of national belonging to arise and find expression, we must return to the national narrative, a voluntarist one, but equally assert our republican values and share our language better.<sup>4</sup>

The ongoing debate over republican values is set against the background of the formation of the nation-state in which 'the incorporation of common norms and values is tied to the sharing of memory, history, sentiments, and attitudes that define a national body' (Simon 2012, 2). This combination of political and cultural dimensions has always been central to the French model of integration as it also subjects the identity of immigrants and their descendants to a range of expectations and suspicions (Simon 2012, 2). In the Goasguen report the values of the French Republic were defined as 'equality men/women, secularism, free access to compulsory education'<sup>5</sup>.

The most heated response to the Goasguen report was targeted at recommendations 18 to 22 which dealt with changes to French dual nationality laws. These proposed changes referred to laws that would compel all naturalised French citizens 'to swear their desire to be French' (Bamat 2011). Recommendation 18 stated that French nationals holding two or more nationalities would be required at the age of eighteen (maturity) to declare their allegiance to France before the mayor. This proposal suggests comparisons with the decision on citizenship which young people of Turkish parentage have to make between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three in Germany. Recommendation 19 of the Goasguen report required all bi-nationals born

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<sup>4</sup> Pour que le sentiment d'appartenance nationale naisse et s'exprime, il nous faut aujourd'hui renouer avec un récit national, volontariste, mais également réaffirmer nos valeurs républicaines, mieux partager notre langue (Goasguen 2011, 8).

<sup>5</sup> 'l'égalité hommes/femmes, la laïcité, l'accès obligatoire et gratuit à l'éducation' (Goasguen 2011, 37).

in France from foreign-born parents to renounce their parents' nationality in order to maintain their French one. It should be noted that these proposed laws would not affect French nationals with French-born parents who had acquired another nationality through naturalisation outside of France.

In his preamble, Goasguen described the notion of dual citizenship as 'a vector for potential conflicts of interests and allegiances' (Bamat 2011). His claim pertains to the old argument that questions whether a naturalised French citizen can belong to France and still have ties to a foreign nation and its people. As Simon argues, unlike in multicultural societies such as Australia, 'dual belonging' through the right of dual nationality is perceived in France by many as a 'conflict in loyalty' (Simon 2012, 3). That is, 'a zero-sum game: commitment to a minority culture or a foreign country detracts from the quality of one's commitment to French identity' (Simon 2012, 1). Furthermore, Simon's report on *French National Identity and Integration* (2012) reveals that although dual citizenship is often portrayed in public debate as being in competition with French national identity, in fact there is little or no conflict. Having an 'ethnic' identity in France does not ignore 'feelings of being invested in and rooted in France' and that these 'hyphenated identities' can actually be conducive to building strong communities (Simon 2012, 1).

Despite the report framing the question of dual nationality exclusively in relation to naturalised immigrants, in many public responses and blogs expatriate French citizens felt that they too were being targeted in this draft report (Connexion 2011). The concerns of these citizens however were inconsequential, for this 'working document' had little chance of ever becoming law and the leaked report 'was never going to be more than the possibility of a debate' (Poirier 2011). Once the controversy erupted, Goasguen, too, was left to defend the recommendations of the leaked report. No member from the UMP spoke out in its defence and François Baroin, a government spokesperson, declared that the government was not in favour of the recommendations on dual nationality (Poirier 2011). At a public function on 7 June President Sarkozy declared that 'nous nous y opposerons totalement': 'we are totally against it' (*Le Post Archives* 2011). The proposal was also denounced as 'scandalously populist' by Eva Joly, the Norwegian-born member for France of the European Parliament and French Green politician (Poirier 2011).

The recent controversy around the Goasguen report begs the question as to why dual nationality had come to the fore in 2011. Part of the response

requires an understanding of how the French government under President Sarkozy wanted to reassure the French people that their way of life would be protected. The historical analysis that follows sheds further light on this question.

## **The events and ideas that influenced the Goasguen Report**

In order to understand how in 2011 the recommendations of the Goasguen report could arise, it is important to investigate the events and attitudes of the past century that have led to political opposition to dual nationality (Poirier 2011). President Sarkozy himself had undermined dual nationality a year earlier in Grenoble where he announced that ‘criminals of foreign origin convicted of the murders of policemen or of any national representatives would lose their French nationality’ (Poirier, 2011). He also demanded that juvenile offenders who were born in France from foreign parents ‘be denied the right to automatically acquire French nationality when they reach adulthood’ (Godin 2013, 58).

In September 2010, a draft law was prepared relating to the topic of immigration, and the right faction of the UMP voted against the automatic acquisition of French citizenship by children born in France to foreign parents (*Le Post Archives* 2011). By doing so, Sarkozy’s objective was to place French citizens into different categories, opposing those with French ancestral roots, ‘*les Français de souche*’, and others (Godin 2013, 58). According to Godin, by tapping into the extreme right’s obsession with dual nationality, Sarkozy’s objective was to contest the Front National’s monopoly on the stigmatisation of immigrants and Islam (Godin 2008, 58).

The Howard Coalition government had made similar moves in Australia. Soon after the 2005 London bombings, the Australian Prime Minister, along with Treasurer Peter Costello, suggested that migrant citizens who held dual nationality but who did not uphold Australian values should be stripped of their Australian citizenship (Costello 2005; Cassidy 2005). As the next section reveals, Howard, like Sarkozy, used the discourse of core civic values as the apparatus that was to secure social cohesion among the citizenry.

## Sarkozy's Values

For many, the main impetus for wanting to abolish dual nationality was an attempt to 'pander' to the supporters of the Front National (Poirier 2011; Godin 2013). This strategy, too, had begun as early as in 2002 when Sarkozy, seeing that the Front National had gained a strong seventeen per cent of the vote in the second round of the presidential elections, used this result to try to capture Le Pen's electorate (Emery 2010, 116) by focussing on right-wing policies and promising harsher treatment of immigrants (Dewhurst Lewis 2011). In Poirier's assessment, Sarkozy's Grenoble declaration was one of his now well-known emotional and calculated speeches whose sole purpose is to cater for a particular fringe of the electorate at a given time, usually taking place straight after an incident (riots, murders, any event that would strike the country's psyche). As often with Sarkozy's announcements, they are undoable or unconstitutional. As Poirier asserts, what he's looking for each time he speaks is to stun his audience, and in this he certainly succeeds (Poirier 2011).

Sarkozy had already introduced many other policy changes that were close to the recommendations of the Goasguen Report. In May 2007, the government created the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. Two years later, it launched the 'Great Debate on National Identity' with the objective of 'codifying what it means to be French' (Simon 2012, 2). This controversial initiative demonstrated how in France the loyalty of immigrants and their descendants has been constantly questioned in public discourse (Simon 2012, 2).

Over the last decade and particularly during his 2007 presidential campaign, Sarkozy's discourse has emphasised securing France's national identity which he believed was based on the French language and Christian roots. Through his nationalist rhetoric, Sarkozy displaced *fraternité* as a key principle of republican values 'in favour of a cultural predisposition to democracy: specifically freedom of speech, gender equality, secular governance and mandatory free education' (Emery 2010, 115). Furthermore, Sarkozy's language of defending democracy as part of French citizenship served to hide the racialised criteria that lay behind the notion of promoting Christianity and the French language to immigrants (Emery 2010, 116).

Sarkozy's actions echo the sentiments and actions of the Howard government and its introduction of the Australian citizenship test. Howard

emphasised Australia's national identity which he believed was based on the English language and Judeo-Christian roots. He promoted freedom of speech, gender equality and secularism as aspects of Australian values. He defended democracy as part of Australian citizenship. In his Australia Day Address to the National Press Gallery, Howard described Australian values as follows:

Most nations experience some level of cultural diversity while also having a dominant cultural pattern running through them. In Australia's case, that dominant pattern comprises Judeo-Christian ethics, the progressive spirit of the Enlightenment and the institutions and values of British political culture. Its democratic and egalitarian temper also bears the imprint of distinct Irish and non-conformist traditions. [...] A sense of shared values is our social cement. Without it, we risk becoming a society governed by coercion rather than consent. (Howard 2006)

In the French context, similar views were expressed. As Emery argues, 'Sarkozy posits an enlightened Judeo-Christian morality at the basis of French democracy and offsets it against anti-republican fanaticism and violence' (2010, 117). Hence *fraternité* and *laïcité* are being replaced by government policies that include citizenship rights that aim to 'expunge' from the French Republic all that is foreign to its declared values. For instance, in October 2005, Sarkozy organised the Machelon Commission which controls religions as a matter of France's national security (Emery 2010, 120). In this respect many of the Goasguen Report's recommendations became the culmination of Sarkozy's campaign for protecting French national identity against the cultural differences emanating from immigrants. Essentially, Sarkozy's actions raise the critical question posed by French historian Patrick Weil, 'What makes one French?' (Weil 2008, 1).

In another of Sarkozy's often quoted speeches, 'Pour la France' (9 May 2006), he focussed on French identity and linguistic pride and counterposed it with rhetoric on cultural 'openness and diversity' in order to 'reassure the French public and to deflect criticism of the markedly nationalist tone of the speech through the infusion of key democratic terms. In effect, it allows for France's national diversity while presenting a single voice in which to communicate with the world' (Emery 2010, 121). This demonstrates how Goasguen's report

had become a manifesto of the right faction of the UMP under the leadership of Sarkozy.

### **Marine Le Pen's letter**

Sarkozy was not alone in targeting dual nationality laws in France. Debates about immigrants' rights to dual nationality are symptomatic of 'the influence of the extreme right in setting the national political agenda' (Poirier 2011). The topic of dual nationality is one that has frequently preoccupied the radical right, including the Front National. The current president of the Front National, Marine Le Pen, has expressed on several occasions 'her distaste for the idea of dual-nationality for French citizens' (*The Franco-American Flophouse* 2011). Her most brash move occurred in May 2011, just one month before the Goasguen report was leaked to the media, when she wrote a letter to the 577 representatives of the National Assembly denouncing the policy of dual nationality in France. In this letter she stressed that it was important for the promotion of France's republican values that all French dual nationals be made to choose between their allegiance to France and to the other country of their dual citizenship (*The Franco-American Flophouse* 2011). Indeed, Le Pen goes as far as to argue that dual nationality 'undermines' republican values. Unlike Goasguen's report, however, Le Pen was emphasising that this was a concern for all French nationals holding dual nationality, whether they were French-born or naturalised French citizens. Le Pen's reference to defending republican values is a common ploy of the Front National through which these values are 'captured and reworked' so that they are promoted as the remedy against the systems of globalisation, Europe and the cosmopolitan and neo-liberal elites who promote these systems (Godin 2013, 55).

In her letter, Le Pen demands that all dual nationals choose between France and the other country:

In the interest of France and other nations, in particular in the interest of our relations with Algeria, the major country of our concern, it is necessary to adopt a genuinely republican approach

by putting an end to dual nationality and to ask each of our compatriots to choose their allegiance: France or another country.<sup>6</sup>

Le Pen's arguments against dual nationality were developed along the lines that it created divided loyalties and destroyed national solidarity, that it was detrimental to assimilation and made participation in elections in two separate nations problematic (*The Franco-American Flophouse* 2011). This is a way of thinking that bases citizenship on socio-biological terms embedded in notions of the national family with all citizens sharing the same history and values. It draws on *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by blood) and is reminiscent of the Vichy régime of World War II in which one was deemed a French national by blood and descent and which led to French Jewish citizens being handed over to the Nazi occupier. Yet despite Le Pen's appeal to republicanism, her letter targeted Algerians as the group of immigrants that were least likely to become naturalised French citizens and this kind of attack was an assault on the republican value of equality itself.

Weil also reminds us that in the past laws against dual nationality, despite Le Pen's claims, were indeed discriminatory in relation to women's rights because French women who married foreign men were stripped of their French nationality and therefore unable to pass on French nationality to their children (*The Franco-American Flophouse* 2011; Weil 2008, 238). Furthermore, nationality laws that were reformed in 1889 to incorporate foreigners and their children have discriminated against Algerian Muslims who had imposed on them an increasingly inferior status (Weil 2008, 6). Although nominally French, they were still obliged 'to go through the naturalisation process to obtain full nationality' (Weil 2008, 253). This, according to Weil, has transmitted a 'trauma' from Algerian parents to their French-born children that creates an identity crisis and manifests itself in street riots that still need to be addressed today (Weil 2008, 253).

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<sup>6</sup> Dans l'intérêt de la France et des autres nations, dans l'intérêt en particulier de nos relations avec l'Algérie, premier pays concerné, il est ainsi nécessaire d'engager une démarche authentiquement républicaine en mettant fin à la double nationalité, et de demander à chacun de nos compatriotes placés dans cette situation de choisir son allégeance : la France, ou un autre pays (Le Pen, cited in *The Franco-American Flophouse* 2011).

Critics like the Front National urge dual nationals to ‘make a choice between their citizenships and select one country in which to exercise their political rights’ (Simon 2012, 2). They believe that there is a lack of commitment to French national identity among second generation North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans. Hence, ‘ethnic minorities were accused of fostering the “balkanisation” of French society with their “communitarianism” and prompting the decline of social cohesion’ (Simon 2012, 2). This is what Weil describes as the ‘Algerian crisis’ in French nationality (Weil 2008, 5).

### **Dual nationality and *Les Bleus***

Another key event that has recently brought the question of dual nationality to the fore was the football incident involving France’s coach Laurent Blanc two months before the media leak of the Goasguen report. On 28 April 2011, the independent French news website, *Mediapart*, released details about an exclusive investigation it had been conducting into secret plans by the French Football Federation’s National Technical Board to introduce a quota selection for young football trainees holding dual nationality. Meetings among football officials had begun as early as 8 November 2010 and a number of directors from the training centres were contacted. The meetings were secretly recorded and they included France’s national football coach, Laurent Blanc, and the influential sports figure François Blaquart, the national technical director of the French Football Federation (FFF). They also included the youth teams’ coaches Erick Mombaerts and Francis Smerecki (BBC News Europe 2011).

It was during these meetings that officials agreed to impose a quota selection process for young players between the ages of twelve and thirteen joining France’s youth training centres. *Mediapart* reported that Blaquart’s plan was targeted specifically at limiting the number of young players from black Africa and the Maghreb and players of Arabic origin from being selected to join the training centres and academies (Arfi, Hajdenberg et al. 2011). It would do this under the premise of introducing a thirty per cent limit for youth holding dual nationality. The centres contacted by the officials included the French National Football Institute based at the Clairefontaine national training centre west of Paris, a renowned football training academy which in the past has produced great French black players including Thierry Henry, Nicolas Anelka, Louis Saha and William Gallas (Arfi, Hajdenberg et al. 2011).

The French team's coach, Laurent Blanc, was also implicated in the incident. He was quoted as stating that he supported a change in the selection criteria and that he was 'very much in favour' (BBC News Europe 2011) of introducing a quota system so that it would encourage young players who had 'our culture, our history' (cited in Arfi, Hajdenberg et al. 2011). Blanc cited the then reigning champions in football, the Spanish national team, which claimed 'We don't have a problem. We have no blacks' (Arfi, Hajdenberg et al. 2011).

The question of dual nationality in this sporting context was presented in terms of those players who were black and with a North African and Arabic heritage. There was no mention of any other youths who were not black but who also held dual nationality being put under a quota system. It is interesting to note that despite the anti-racist stand taken by FIFA and other sporting bodies (Rowe 2010), citizenship in the football scandal was being used as a mechanism to 'maintain' the perceived cultural homogeneity of the French people by reducing the number of potential black players.

Immediately after the story was leaked by *Mediapart*, the Minister for Sport, Chantal Jouanno, suspended Blaquart from his position as FFF national technical director and ordered an investigation into the affair. In his defence, Blaquart argued that his comments had been taken out of context, stating that 'we acknowledged the fact that there were many players with dual nationality [...], we had to control the management of these players who might be leaving us' (cited in BBC News Europe 2011). Once again the notion of loyalty crept into the debate. It is the black player with dual nationality who has to prove his loyalty to his country of birth or choice. While first denying any participation in the meetings, Blanc later admitted his role in them, apologised and defended his claims stating that he was not racist or xenophobic (BBC News Europe 2011).

The incident caused great controversy in the French football world (Reuters 2011) with many French players divided in their opinion of Blanc. He received support from his former teammate Zinedine Zidane, a Marseille-born Frenchman of Algerian background (Poirier 2011). Blanc apologised for what he claimed was a 'poor choice of words' but reiterated that his suggestion of a quota was to limit potential defections from players with dual nationality during international competitions (Poirier 2011). In the end, two investigations found that Blanc had not done anything wrong but the notion of a quota for young players holding dual nationality was scrapped for good. Yet the timing

of the Goasguen report's release only a couple months later suggests that the football incident may have provided some 'food for thought' for Goasguen. The *Bleus* incident highlighted the widely held conservative view that there is an 'unfair advantage' for those with dual nationality who have a choice of loyalty (Simon 2012, 2).

Other incidents involving football a few years earlier had also raised the question of allegiance from French nationals of immigrant backgrounds. The summer before the dual nationality quota scandal, in June 2010, an incident arose where the French player Nicolas Anelka was expelled for bad language from the French team at the World Cup in South Africa and, in support of him, the rest of the French football team refused to train. As a result, the non-white players in the French team were accused of 'playing for money and not the country' (Hussey 2011). Hussey concludes that these anxieties experienced by the French football team are 'essentially less to do with sport than to do with national identity and ultimately the meaning of the French Republic' (Hussey 2011). Like the dual nationality laws of the Goasguen report, the debate is 'about who is to be included in French life and who is to be excluded from it' (Hussey 2011).

Other sporting incidents have contributed to the debate on dual nationality. In 2001 and 2002 at matches between France and Algeria some supporters booed the French national anthem, *La Marseillaise*, and on one occasion President Jacques Chirac left the stadium in disgust (Poirier 2011). These supporters were second and third generation French citizens and their actions scandalised many French 'mainstream' citizens. Although *La Marseillaise* has been described by some as chauvinistic and outdated, the act of booing the national anthem was still considered by most to be an offensive 'symbolic gesture' (Poirier 2011). Goasguen refers to this incident in his preamble, stating that globalisation brings with it unpleasant outcomes and divided loyalties even in a 'friendly' match:

Conflicts of a legal nature emerge as individuals acquire new ties and as the hierarchy of norms gets more complex; points of reference disappear or become blurred and confusions of identity

manifest themselves, the seriousness of which could be seen in 2001 in the friendly football match between France and Algeria.<sup>7</sup>

## Dual Nationality in France today

The recent concerns relating to national identity, social cohesion and immigration in France have not disappeared with the defeat of President Sarkozy in May 2012. François Hollande has dismantled many of Sarkozy's tough policies on naturalisation, such as easing the French language requirements for aspiring French citizens and streamlining the administrative process of granting French citizenship in order to promote migrant integration into the French community (Hubert 2013). Yet despite these changes, President Hollande's government has continued to implement some decisions that were initiated by Sarkozy and which have proven to be detrimental to the citizenship status of many French nationals.

In particular, the decision taken by the Interior Minister Manuel Valls in August 2012 to dismantle the Roma camps in Lille and Lyon (Ockrent 2012) revealed how Hollande's new socialist government, too, is preoccupied with securing French identity against the 'dangerous' Roma ethnic minorities. In ordering the demolition of Roma camps, Valls was continuing the work that Sarkozy had outlined in his Grenoble speech in 2010. Yet somewhat ironically, Valls, referring specifically to that speech, claimed that in contrast to Sarkozy, he was approaching the Roma problem 'with serenity'. In September 2013, Valls called for France's Roma to be expelled, that is, to be sent back to the border (*Le Monde* 2013) because they were not capable of integrating into French society even though the 'overwhelming majority' of Roma living in France have been reported as being French citizens (Ockrent 2012). Hollande's government then, like that of its predecessor, is also engaging in 'non-serene' actions in its quest to protect the 'real' French citizen.

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<sup>7</sup> Des conflits de loi éclatent à mesure que les individus multiplient les attaches et que se complexifie la hiérarchie des normes ; des repères tombent ou se brouillent et des malaises identitaires s'expriment dont, en 2001, le match amical de football entre la France et l'Algérie a pu montrer l'acuité (p. 6).

To conclude, this history of the events and debates that influenced the production and the subsequent withdrawal of the Goasguen Report reveals how the themes of citizenship, immigration and national identity, as in Australia, cannot be separated from each other. The civic right for all French citizens to hold dual nationality is traditionally considered to be an integral part of France's republican values. Yet the recent spate of political and public events, political speeches, sporting scandals and social upheavals have challenged the notion that all French nationals have the right to hold the status of dual nationality. Under Goasguen's proposals, the right for foreign-born French nationals to hold dual citizenship would have been abolished. Yet the report never came to fruition and today dual nationality continues to be a legal entity in France for all of its citizens, whether French-born or naturalised. Hence, the failure of the Goasguen Report to become law suggests that legal equality among immigrants and the 'mainstream' can be maintained in French society despite ongoing economic inequalities.

The proposals of the failed Goasguen report, as well as the *Australian Values Statement* and the Australian citizenship test, are meant to be integral parts of immigration and naturalisation procedures, encouraging a sense of community participation in decision making in national population policies. These attempts and measures become 'programmes for reforming reality' (Miller and Rose 2008, 29). They are promoted as capable of creating consensus among members of the community, French or Australian, so that they can feel reassured that the make-up of the 'ideal' citizenry is 'in their hands' and 'programmable'.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, rather than focussing solely on how these proposed changes to dual nationality laws impacted on republican values, it is also important to understand that this recent discourse aimed to reassure the mainstream that their way of life was secure. As Laborde (2008, 142) argues, the symbolic restoration of citizenship that focuses on norms and values of universalism and equality 'increasingly functions in a performative rhetorical register without real purchase [on social reality]'. In other words, attempting to reform dual nationality laws is a performative act.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. 'We will decide who comes to this country' (Howard, 2001) .

<sup>9</sup> In J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts performative acts refer to utterances which don't describe reality but constitute actions in themselves. The classical example is 'I now pronounce you husband and wife'.

Although many of Sarkozy's announcements were not doable, they contained the shock value to show the 'mainstream' French population that the government was dealing with the crisis in citizenship, the clash of civilisations and the 'ill effects' of globalisation (Poirier 2011). Therefore, ongoing debates about dual nationality and how best to ensure the integration of the immigrant into the 'mainstream' community, whether through traditional republican values or Australia's liberal-democratic values, are significant. They seek to define what it means to be a 'model' French or Australian naturalised citizen in the twenty-first century.

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